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In The Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin suggests that a kind of “productive 
disorder” is the canon of both the collector (Sammler) and involuntary 
memory. This chapter investigates how this “productive disorder” can 
apply to the conceptual figure of the atlas. Following closely – although 
with some detours – Georges Didi-Huberman’s Atlas, or the Anxious Gay 
Science and its characterization of the atlas as a visual form of knowledge, 
it explores a thought space in which fragmentation and reconfiguration 
emerge as fully operative notions. The di!erent sections complement each 
other and unfold the “essential dialectic” of the atlas: on the one hand, 
a materialist dimension linked to the sovereign individuality of things; 
on the other hand, a psychic dimension linked to association, memory 
and imagination. The atlas takes part in a struggle against dispersion and 
chaos and makes productive certain principles of observation linked to 
morphology and physiognomy. In addition, it entails various forms of 
exercise related to aesthetic and political issues, to correspondances and 
to the infinite interplay between childhood and adulthood. Two features 
make up the ambivalence of the atlas and threaten its productivity: the risk 
of the ever-new and the risk of forgetting the ragpicker (Lumpensammler), 
a figure whose spirit of “collection” becomes an intrinsically economic 
and urban matter.
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Everything we call invention, discovery in a higher sense, is the 
significant practice [Ausübung], activation of an original instinct for 
truth, long developed in secret, which suddenly and at lightning speed 
turns into a fruitful perception.
Goethe, Maxims and Reflections, 416.
Walter Benjamin’s The Arcades Project (Das Passagen-Werk) is an unfinished 
work of philosophy of history that delves into nineteenth-century Paris in order 
to apprehend the features and ambiguities of modernity in its complex relation 
to the ancient and the present. It consists of a massive collection of quotations 
and insightful remarks organized thematically in convolutes, the latter bringing 
order to the seemingly scattered elements and allowing one to more easily detect 
connections and a"nities between them – not only across specific convolutes, 
but across the entire volume. It is thus a project that is open to countless 
interpretations and whose fertility extends far beyond the thematic and formal 
scope envisaged by its author.
Convolute H focuses on the figure of the collector. One of its remarks 
suggests that a kind of “productive disorder” is the canon of both the collector 
(Sammler) and involuntary memory (Benjamin, 1999f, p. 211 [H 5, 1]). It is 
important to stress that central figures of The Arcades Project, such as the 
collector, the allegorist and the flâneur, are touched “by the confusion, by the 
scatter, in which the things of the world are found” (Benjamin, 1999f, p. 211 
[H 4a, 1]). Hence, this scattered state of things can be considered a condition 
for the emergence of the productive element. In other words: disorder becomes 
productive if one confronts it directly and “takes up the struggle against 
dispersion” (Benjamin, 1999f, p. 211 [H 4a, 1]). The three figures – collector, 
allegorist and flâneur – reveal a heightened capacity to take up this struggle, 
and apart from their di!erences this binds them together. The collector rescues 
objects from their previous function and from their commodity character, 
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introducing them into a new and magical world with laws of its own. The 
allegorist takes things out of their context, transforming them into a fragment 
that initiates an unpredictable process of meditation. The flâneur, part stroller, 
part detective, deals with the countless stimulations of urban life, reacting in his 
own rhythm and observing details that reveal the ambiguous confluence of the 
archaic and the modern in the industrialized and ever-changing city of Paris. 
The heightened capacity to counteract disorder is not far removed 
from the qualities of the physiognomist’s gaze, and at times Benjamin uses the 
semantic field of physiognomy to characterize the task of both the materialist 
historian and some of the pivotal characters of The Arcades Project.2 Despite 
the seemingly “dispersive character” of the latter, several of its quotations and 
remarks were used as source material in important (and finished) essays on 
Charles Baudelaire, Franz Kafka, Eduard Fuchs, and photography, to name 
just a few, and even in short stories such as “The Lucky Hand”, an enigmatic 
tale that touches upon another ambivalent figure of modernity: the gambler. 
Gambling can be conceived of as a “decayed form of divination” (Dolbear, 
Leslie and Truskolaski, 2016, p. xxix), and, in fact, a theme that underpins 
the remarks on gambling in The Arcades Project and “The Lucky Hand” is 
the intuitive presence of mind that involves subliminal bodily knowledge. 
Gambling, although spoiled by money, is a concrete school for this gift, which 
in its own way deals with chance and disorder – and, against and through them, 
allows one to make a successful move.
There are several theoretical gateways to the themes of dispersion, 
disorder and chaos. Philosophy itself, and the manifold concepts that form its 
history, can be understood as an attempt to deal with them. A good example 
is to be found in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s definition of the plane of 
immanence in What is Philosophy? If philosophy consists in the creation of 
concepts, the plane of immanence is the very instituting of philosophy. Although 
pre-philosophical, it “does not exist outside philosophy” but “implies a sort of 
groping experimentation[,] and its layout resorts to measures that are not very 
2 For instance: “To write history means giving dates their physiognomy” (Benjamin, 
1999f, p. 476 [N ll, 2]. And: collectors “are physiognomists of the world of things” 
(Benjamin, 1999f, p. 207 [H 2, 7; H2a, 1]). This physiognomic strand equally applies 
to Benjamin’s overall approach to the urban as a space whose traces can be read and 
deciphered. On this subject, see Gilloch, 1996, pp. 5-7. 
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respectable, rational, or reasonable” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 41). It 
operates by sectioning chaos and “acts like a sieve”: 
Chaos is not an inert or stationary state, nor is it a chance mixture. 
Chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite. 
The problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without 
losing the infinite into which thought plunges (in this respect 
chaos has as much a mental as a physical existence). (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994, p. 42) 
According to this framework, and relying on Jean-Pierre Vernant, the Greek 
Logos is characterized as a seminal “plane-sieve”, i.e. the first philosophical 
response “to conceive of a strict immanence of Order to a cosmic milieu that 
sections chaos in the form of a plane” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 43). 
How do these di!erent motives – the productive disorder and the struggle 
against chaos – converge in the conceptual figure of the atlas? In Atlas, or the 
Anxious Gay Science,3 Georges Didi-Huberman makes use of the Deleuzian 
and Guattarian notion of “sections of chaos” when referring to Aby Warburg’s 
seminal Atlas Mnemosyne, an iconographic project by the German art historian 
that brings together, in the same plates, images from di!erent epochs and styles, 
creating a montage of heterogeneous elements (see Didi-Huberman, 2018, p. 
153). In a more general way, one may concede that there is “an unexpected 
complicity – of the kind that particularly worries philosophers descended from 
Plato – between classification and disorder or, if we prefer, between reason and 
imagination” (Didi-Huberman, 2018, p. 42). This remark stresses that the 
atlas form potentiates the tension and complicity between the classificatory 
arrangement and the possibility of the constant rearrangement of things by 
way of montage. Moreover, in several respects, this process resembles ancient 
practices of divination. Although seemingly irrational in the light of a rationalist 
conception of science, these practices are devoid neither of a spirit of ordering 
and classification, as anthropology has shown for decades, nor of the capacity 
to integrate sensible things and their intelligible relations, however “primitive” 
3 Written on the occasion of an exhibition designed for the Museo Nacional Centro de 
Arte Reina Sofía in 2011.
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they may seem (see Didi-Huberman, 2018, pp. 34-46). Besides these practices, 
there are gestures in gambling that resemble those that potentiate the “heuristic 
configurations” of an atlas:
To shu#e and to redistribute cards, to disassemble and to 
reassemble the order of images on a table to create “quasi-
divinatory” heuristic configurations, that is, which are capable of 
glimpsing the working of time in the visible world: Such would be 
the basic operating sequence for any practice that we call here an 
atlas. (Didi-Huberman, 2018, p. 48)
Strictly speaking, making an atlas is not equivalent to making a collection (nor 
is it equivalent to creating philosophical concepts), but the activity of collecting 
and the mechanisms of its “productive disorder” add important elements to 
the theoretical elaboration of this conceptual figure. An atlas, like a collection, 
results from and is indicative of a tendency to arrange things according to their 
correspondences, and at the core of this tendency lies an acute awareness that 
things in the world are in a state of dispersion. This is a variant of a general 
struggle with di!erent names and di!erent forms, a “struggle against chaos 
[that] does not take place without an a"nity with the enemy” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994, p. 203). As for the productive disorder of the atlas, which often 
merges various disciplines and forms, Aby Warburg’s Atlas Mnemosyne can be 
considered a shining example (this is further developed in section 4 below).
On the other hand, it is not by chance that Didi-Huberman connects the 
themes of dispersion, disorder and chaos to both the philosophical-historical 
endeavour of The Arcades Project and the methodological principles of Goethean 
morphology. Which features of the latter allow for this connection? First and 
foremost, the principle of polarity and the need for organization that can be 
related to certain principles of observation, comparison and ordering. Putting these 
principles into practice can o!er a glimpse, a point of access, if only momentary, 
into that which is a primal phenomenon (Urphänomen) in them and which is 
intrinsic to the singular occurrences and the laws that guide their metamorphosis. 
Moreover, it is a process that knows no end. On this topic, Maria Filomena Molder 
recalls Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s description of the link between authentic 
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theory and “the inexhaustible life of each and every thing: ‘on a daily basis, more 
relations between the things and ourselves are found, there is always something, 
coming from things, which awakes in us. I mean, things are infinite’” (Molder, 
1995, p. 290).4 In the first place, the heuristic principles of morphology respond 
to this “excess of forms” through a description of each singular thing that should 
avoid any determination that is exterior to it; in the second place, they respond by 
relating it to the whole. And since a sensitive gaze and the use of memory are not 
enough to achieve this, the conjunction of comprehensive intuition (Einsehen) and 
judgement (Urteil) becomes necessary (see Molder, 1995, p. 220). A delicate form 
of empiricism (zarte Empirie)5 is the basis for a theory that is intrinsically linked to 
facts. At the same time, this method allows for the discovery of a"nities between 
the diverse manifestations of the singular.6
It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to thoroughly explore the 
fertility of morphological concepts, but it is symptomatic that Didi-Huberman 
takes them as one of the main theoretical resources for reflecting on the atlas 
form. Apart from the aspects mentioned above, he stresses the morphological 
character of the polarities – between astra and monstra – and the a"nities 
between images that are made manifest in the montages of Warburg’s Atlas 
Mnemosyne (see Didi-Huberman, 2018, pp. 116-138).
Let us now return to the entry from The Arcades Project mentioned 
at the very beginning of this section, which relates collection and mémoire 
involontaire by way of productive disorder. Benjamin refers to a passage from 
Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time:
4 The quotation at the end of this excerpt comes from a conversation that Goethe had 
with Riemer on 2 August 1807. As with all other quotations in this chapter that do 
not refer to an existing translation, the translation is my own.
5 Maxim 565 reads: “There is a delicate form of empiricism which enters into the 
closest union with its object and is therefore transformed into an actual theory” 
(Goethe, 1998, p. 75). 
6 Benjamin mentions that his project on “the origin of the forms and mutations of the 
Paris arcades from their beginning to their decline”, grounded mostly in economic 
facts, owes a lot to morphological notions, and he compares the unfolding “of the 
arcade’s concrete historical forms” with a leaf that “unfolds from itself all the riches 
of the empirical world of plants” (Benjamin, 1999f, p. 462 [N 2a, 4]). This entails a 
transposition of the concept of “primal phenomena” from the domain of nature to 
that of history. On this transposition, see Molder, 2020.
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“And I had already lived long enough so that, for more than one 
of the human beings with whom I had come in contact, I found in 
antipodal regions of my past memories another being to complete 
the picture. […] In much the same way, when an art lover is shown 
a panel of an altar screen, he remembers in what church, museum, 
and private collection the other panels are dispersed (likewise, 
he finally succeeds, by following the catalogues of art sales or 
frequenting antique shops, in finding the mate to the object he 
possesses and thereby completing the pair, and so can reconstruct 
in his mind the predella and the entire altar).” Marcel Proust, Le 
Temps retrouvé (Paris), vol. 2, p. 158. The mémoire volontaire, 
on the other hand, is a registry providing the object with a 
classificatory number behind which it disappears. (Benjamin, 
1999f, p. 211 [H 5, l])
Two aspects of this piece are deserving of attention. The first concerns the pivotal 
role played by objects in collecting and involuntary memory; in both of them, 
and contrary to what occurs in voluntary memory, objects do not disappear 
behind a simple “classificatory number”. Another entry in The Arcades Project 
goes in this direction, as the collector and remembrances of the solitary are 
said to imply a “tête-à-tête with things” (Benjamin, 1999f, p. 866 [Qº,6]). In 
remembrance we are alone with things that, over time, are silently ordered 
around us, forming the invisible threads that bind them together and that we 
might one day be capable of apprehending. A few lines after the piece quoted by 
Benjamin, Proust adds that these invisible threads are also linked to the di!erent 
roles a person or an object has played in our lives. He then concludes:
If after an interval of several years I rediscovered in my memory 
a mere social acquaintance or even a physical object, I perceived 
that life all this while had been weaving round person or thing a 
tissue of diverse threads which ended by covering them with the 
beautiful and inimitable velvety patina of the years, just as in an 
old park a simple runnel of water comes with the passage of time to 
be enveloped in a sheath of emerald. (Proust, 1993, pp. 416-417) 
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Not only does the unfolding of these roles played by persons and objects require 
time, but all this has, for Proust, the quality of oneiric images. Benjamin doesn’t 
further develop the reasons behind the proposed kinship between collector and 
involuntary memory. Nonetheless, the passages that explicitly or implicitly 
point to productive disorder and the role objects play in it seem to be the glue 
that holds this kinship together. In this Proustian context, it also accounts for 
the working of time – and of forgetfulness and recollection as the two poles with 
which life silently weaves its “diverse threads”.7
Secondly, the art collector and the one who remembers are not given the 
ability to find the beings and objects that complete each other from the outset, 
as this can only be achieved after one lives “long enough”. Whether this ability 
is ever attained is another question, but it nonetheless seems to presuppose a 
particular kind of life experience, and not so much a specific and quantifiable 
age (more on this in section 5).
The di!erent aspects of the “productive disorder” seen until now can be 
brought together around two key features of the atlas, which Didi-Huberman, 
in the wake of Benjamin’s work on memory, collection and the world of images, 
pinpoints as its “essential dialectic”: on the one hand, a materialist dimension 
linked to the sovereign individuality of things, to the attention demanded of us 
by the endlessness of phenomena; on the other hand, a psychic dimension linked 
to association, memory, the magic of play and imagination (see Didi-Huberman, 
2018, p. 63). The following sections will unfold this “essential dialectic” and 




A particular use of the term atlas by Walter Benjamin allows new aspects of 
this conceptual figure to be developed. In “Little History of Photography”, 
August Sander’s portraits of German society in the first decades of the twentieth 
century are described as follows: “Sander’s work is more than a picture book: 
7 For an interpretation of Proust’s Recherche as a Penelopean work in which 
recollection and forgetting are interwoven, see Benjamin, 1999d, pp. 237-238.
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an exercising atlas [Übungsatlas]” (Benjamin, 1999b, p. 520).8 The “very 
impartial” but “delicate” form of observation they entail can be considered 
an heir of Goethe’s “delicate empiricism [zarte Empirie]” (Benjamin, 1999b, p. 
520), i.e. an observation that gives objects a central role.9 In addition, Sander’s 
work also belongs to a physiognomic tradition and, in particular, to the way 
cinema and photography depicted anonymous faces. Yet there is more to this:
Work like Sander’s could overnight assume unlooked-for topicality. 
Sudden shifts of power such as are now overdue in our society can 
make the ability to read facial types a matter of vital importance. 
Whether one is of the Left or the Right, one will have to get used 
to being looked at in terms of one’s provenance. And one will have 
to look at others the same way. (Benjamin, 1999b, p. 520)
The physiognomic character of Sander’s work unfolds in two essential themes: 
on the one hand, it concerns reading faces, bodies and the social context (often 
professional) immobilized in each of the portraits; on the other hand, and 
concomitantly, it concerns a practical purpose that is social in nature, appropriate 
to a time of rapid political change and growing racial tensions. Benjamin realizes 
that the physiognomic question might be the order of the day, but not as a pseudo-
scientific revitalization of the positivist approaches developed in the nineteenth 
century, often with a simplistic reading of the relationship between the exterior 
(the traits of the person) and the interior (personality, moral characteristics). 
Rather, it is a matter of attending to a particular social and historical moment. 
By and large, Sander’s work belongs to a Western physiognomic tradition whose 
main roots are to be found at the end of the eighteenth century, in authors such as 
Lavater and Goethe, and which in the first three decades of the twentieth century 
gained renewed impetus and even a social field of action that went far beyond the 
simple search for a correspondence between anatomical features and the internal 
characteristics of individuals (see Somaini, 2015, pp. 87-96). In this sense, as 
8 Translation slightly modified.
9 For a broader account on this topic, see my “Images to Exercise Ourselves. 
Morphology between August Sander’s Photographs and Gerhard Richter’s Atlas” 
(Conceição, 2013).
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Antonio Somaini points out, Goethe’s morphology, and in particular the assertion 
that “Everything factual is already theory” (Goethe, 1998, p. 77), helped to 
renew physiognomy in the sense that the surface, the phenomenal manifestation, 
dissolves the fallacies of the relationship between interior and exterior. On the 
other hand, the “exercising atlas” responds to a tradition in the field of children’s 
literature with a pedagogical goal, developed over the centuries and particularly 
since Johann Amos Comenius’s Orbis Pictus, from 1658 – a tradition that explored 
not only various areas of knowledge but also di!erent forms of presenting textual 
and visual data. In this sense, it is worth mentioning the atlas Gesellschaft und 
Wirtschaft (Society and Economy), published in 1930 by Otto Neurath and Gern 
Arntz. Illustrating the state of a!airs of the world in di!erent areas, it stemmed 
from previous experiments in graphic design, thus providing an album whose 
images could be “rearranged in di!erent configurations” (Somaini, 2015, p. 100).
Whether or not Benjamin’s interpretation was directly influenced by this 
second tradition, Sander’s work, ordered in series with a view to a very particular 
social typology, contributes to a pedagogy of the gaze that is invested with the 
aesthetic and socio-political potentialities of documentary photography – at the 
threshold between art and science. Sander’s atlas is infinite, as is the task of 
visually ordering the scattered elements of society, a relentless exercise whose 
goal is not given beforehand but rather demands a bold and delicate form of 
observation.
Childhood is the age of exercise (Übung, also translatable as practice 
or training) par excellence, and in Benjamin’s work it is often associated with 
the mimetic faculty and with play. But to trace the presence of this notion in 
his early work, one needs to consider a collection of notes entitled “Learning 
and Exercising” (“Lernen und Üben”), in which the progress of learning is 
associated with continuity, and exercising with a discontinuity that comes about 
suddenly. The latter is not a form of acquiring knowledge but the acquisition of 
the ability (Fähigkeit) to have it at one’s disposal. In this sense, it corresponds 
to an intuitive understanding/insight (Einsehen) rather than a having (Haben) 
(Benjamin 1991, pp. 77-78).
Besides, exercising, as painters and jugglers well know, has much 
to do with the repetition of gestures that allow the body to attune its own 
mechanisms, a repetition that demands pausing and intervals. In this respect, 
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the juggler Rastelli is the main character of a thought-image (Denkbild) that is 
a little treatise on the virtues and secret mechanisms of exercising (Benjamin, 
1999e, pp. 590-591). 
By evoking a link between exercise and physiognomy, Benjamin is drawing 
attention to a “matter of vital importance” that has to do with the historical 
tensions of his time, but also with the importance of a type of knowledge that 
is linked to practical life. In “Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm”, Carlo 
Ginzgurg describes an epistemological paradigm that connects venatic lore, the 
history of medicine, the analysis of certain details in works of art, psychoanalysis, 
detective stories and divination practices. It is a “conjectural knowledge” that 
also has deep roots in practical life (see Ginzburg, 1989). After establishing the 
necessary di!erences between the various domains and the developments that 
some of them underwent throughout the nineteenth century – moving closer to 
a positivist approach that understands traces as evidence within the framework 
of societies of control – Ginzburg poses a question about the scientific character 
of “conjectural knowledge”: is the precision sought by the scientific and 
quantitative approach important for everyday life? In fact, there are situations in 
which the “flexible rigour (pardon the oxymoron) of the conjectural paradigm 
seems impossible to suppress” (Ginzburg, 1989, p. 124). Physiognomy is a good 
example of this, and in particular the term firãsa, a complex notion that was the 
basis of ancient Arabic physiognomy, implying the use of clues in order to draw a 
connection between the known and the unknown. Though reluctantly, Ginzburg 
uses the term “intuition” to describe what is at stake here. Firãsa has less to do 
with any mystical intuition or modern forms of irrationalism, however; rather, 
it is a “low intuition” based on the senses, implying various forms of life and 
bringing the human animal closely together with other animals. 
Apart from Lavater’s naturalistic endeavour and later tendencies that 
would couple it with phenomena such as eugenics, physiognomy’s history is a 
much more complex issue. Arabic physiognomy, whose roots are prior to its 
contact with the Greek tradition, had two impulses at its origin: the naturalist 
impulse, linked to medicine, and the astrological impulse, linked to divination. 
More than a science, firãsa was an art, an exercise of the gift of judging a person 
on the basis of external signs, “a practice of the glance and the art of detail” 
(Courtine and Haroche, 1997, p. 31). This exercise demanded an experienced 
Conceptual Figures of Fragmentation and Reconfiguration
[142]
gaze and had eminently practical purposes, linked to justice, commerce, 
sexuality and, sometimes, to predicting the future.
The multitude of faces that compose the ebb and flow of big cities, in a 
mass movement that makes it di"cult to perceive identities and singularities, 
o!ers new challenges and new functions to this physiognomic heritage. 
Nineteenth-century metropolises clearly strengthened and further entrenched 
the notion that social conditions can have an impact on faces and expressions, 
and the popular Parisian novels called physiologies are a seminal testimony to 
the attempt to decipher urban traits. Prior to this, however, ancient practices 
connected to daily life presuppose that the ordinary man is a physiognomist 
without knowing it whenever this exercise of the gaze is used to choose one’s 
company, and whom to avoid (see Courtine and Haroche, 1997, pp. 32-33). 
Thus, it would be no exaggeration to say that Sander’s atlas enters fully into 
a social and political game of di!erentiations and precautions, of choices and 
warnings. Benjamin’s essay on photography, published in Germany in 1933, 
foresaw it as an atlas for an endangered daily life.
3.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL EXERCISES
The narrator. – He who narrates something soon reveals whether he is 
doing so because the subject interests him or whether by doing so he 
hopes to arouse interest. In the latter case he will exaggerate, employ 
superlatives and the like. He will then usually narrate badly, because he 
is thinking not so much of the subject as of himself.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, § 343
This singular relationship between exercise and the conceptual figure of the 
atlas raises yet another question: who is given the chance to make an atlas? On 
the one hand, we can be detached spectators and researchers of the aesthetic 
forms and theoretical aspects of the “productive disorder”; on the other hand, 
we can be an active part of its elaboration, each time we actively take on – from 
within – the task of putting into practice and reorganizing an atlas according 
to our interests.
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On 20 February 2019, I held a seminar that was the basis for the present 
chapter, risking what I called at the time “my exercise with the atlas”. Having 
worked on di!erent occasions on the atlases of August Sander, Gerhard Richter 
and Aby Warburg, the time had come to set my own productive disorder in 
motion under the guise of montage. The autobiographical part of the seminar 
was tied to a particular constellation of names, places and objects related to the 
cities in which I was born and grew up, between Germany and Portugal, and 
crystallized in the Neue Weltatlas (New World Atlas) that my parents still have 
in their bookcase, a constellation that cannot be reproduced here. Two years 
on, its dreamlike character seems to have vanished, or perhaps to be hiding in a 
secret place. But the tensions brought up by the preparation of the seminar led 
to the formulation of three heuristic principles.
The first principle is that the most important thing is not the truthfulness 
of the narrative but the way the selected clues and objects of the past are 
combined – interwoven, to recall Proust’s “invisible threads” – with narrative 
elements, establishing a game of resonances that is projected into the present. 
My personal indi!erence towards the Neue Weltaltas was interrupted by a 
gesture of fragmentation: fragments were torn from it and set a reconfiguration 
in motion. Its cartographic, social and economic character did not disappear 
but was combined, as it were, with the aesthetic powers of memory and 
imagination. 
The second principle is that the names of cities, places and streets, as well 
as certain people’s names, acquire a specific connotation for each of us, and it 
is symptomatic that the cities we know by heart rarely seem to be the cities that 
others know by the same name. Proust shows this in a subtle way: the names of 
cities and places – some unknown by the narrator – that populate the Recherche 
are loaded with expectations and fantasies built on fragmentary information. On 
the other hand, urban places, like objects, can ignite remembrance and the power 
of evocation. Walter Benjamin extended some of these Proustian themes in Berlin 
Chronicle, and later in Berlin Childhood around 1900. In the former, he reflects 
on the characteristics of remembrance as a “deadly game”: “What Proust began 
so playfully became awesomely serious. He who has once begun to open the fan 
of memory never comes to the end of its segments. No image satisfies him, for 
he has seen that it can be unfolded, and only in its folds does the truth reside” 
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(Benjamin, 1999a, p. 597). Filtered through expectation and remembrance, 
names and places are to be found in the folds – and cities “are” unfolded images.
The third principle attempts to answer the following question: how can 
individual accounts of the past connect with the present, and thus gain historical 
relevance? In the prologue to the final version of Berlin Childhood around 
1900, Benjamin refers to the dangers enclosed in the nostalgic dimension of 
the memories of a bourgeois child. Hence the need to “inoculate” his images of 
metropolitan childhood with the vaccine of the irretrievability of the past, “not 
the contingent biographical but the necessary social irretrievability” (Benjamin, 
2002, p. 344). It is this inoculation and the experimental form of the images 
that grant them the capacity to preform “later historical experience” and that 
link individual and collective life. Benjamin’s “‘autobiographical’ fragments are 
thus exercises in critical historiography rather than wistful nostalgia” (Gilloch, 
1996, p. 60). In this sense, the images of Berlin are also deeply connected with 
– and somehow anticipate – the physiognomic and materialist approach further 
developed in The Arcades Project.
4.
A VISUAL FORM OF KNOWLEDGE
In its most common sense, an atlas is a collection of maps with graphic 
representations that may include geographic, social, historical, economic or 
climatic data. It was Gerardus Mercator (a Flemish mathematician, geographer 
and cartographer) who, in 1595, first used the term “atlas” in connection with 
cartography. The name was inspired by the Titan Atlas, who was condemned 
by Zeus to hold the celestial heavens on his shoulders, but Mercator retrieves a 
complex mythological genealogy and draws inspiration from the philosopher, 
geographer and mathematician King Atlas of Mauritania. This is not the 
place to delve into the cartographic definition of the term “atlas”, much less 
to examine mythological themes and their artistic representations (such as 
the sculpture Farnese Atlas, the oldest and perhaps the most famous of all). 
Although cartography can be said to account, in its own way, for a struggle 
against the dispersion that makes up the world, let us instead analyse the atlas 
as a visual form of knowledge, on the footsteps of Didi-Huberman’s essay.
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The gaze that delicately surveys the images and the diverse elements of 
an atlas, whether it belongs to medicine, cartography or contemporary art, 
often focuses on a detail, a particular sequence or constellation, an analogy 
or synthesis, and this presupposes a tension between the singularity of each 
element and the whole of which it is a part. As with any open device, each 
visitation can harbour discoveries. According to Didi-Huberman, the atlas 
implies two paradigms: the aesthetic, linked to the visual, and the epistemic, 
linked to knowledge. Furthermore, and in the face of the rationalist certainties 
of science and the predetermined models of art history, it has a destabilizing 
power, deeply rooted in the procedures of montage: “Against all epistemic 
purity, the atlas introduces the sensible dimension into knowledge, the diverse, 
and the incomplete character of each image. Against any aesthetic purity, it 
introduces the multiple, the diverse, the hybridity of any montage” (Didi-
Huberman, 2018, p. 4). Its driving force is imagination, understood not as a 
personal and gratuitous fantasy but as a transversal faculty that allows for the 
discovery of “the intimate and secret relations of things, the correspondences 
and the analogies” (Baudelaire’s words in “Notes Nouvelles sur Edgar Poe”, 
recovered by Didi-Huberman, 2018, p. 5).
Among the vast theoretical references in Atlas, or the Anxious Gay 
Science, the role of four themes and authors should be highlighted: the 
restlessness of Friedrich Nietzsche’s gay science; Goethean morphology and its 
principles of observation and synoptic presentation, through which one can 
approach primal phenomena (Urphänomena); Walter Benjamin’s thought, 
namely his reflections on the concepts of origin and dialectical image, which 
take elements from Goethean morphology while focusing on the domain of 
history (and, as seen above, the entire question of productive disorder); and 
finally, Aby Warburg’s intersection of image and memory, which takes the 
atlas form to a whole new dimension. It is worth emphasizing the central 
role that his science of culture attributes to the notion of Nachleben, of 
survival. Leaning on it, Warburg’s studies on art history establish direct 
relationships between distant epochs, such as antiquity and the Renaissance. 
These relationships are not strictly formal, stylistic or thematic, however; 
they involve a whole series of polarities that unfold the conflicts between the 
rational and the magical-religious dimension of the human being, between 
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the Apollonian and the Dionysian, between calm contemplation and orgiastic 
fervour. As a reader of Nietzsche, Warburg finds in this intensified psychic 
dynamic the substratum of artistic creation itself (see Warburg, 2003, p. 
3). Additionally, the notion of Pathosformeln, or “formulae of pathos”, 
concerns the gestures that fixate the deeply rooted energetic and conflicting 
forces that run through the images. These reflect the schizophrenia of Western 
culture itself, its psychic conflicts and repressions, its expressive gestures and 
repetitions. All this presupposes a conception of memory that is not governed 
by a chronological and sequential order, and the montage that Warburg 
develops in Atlas Mnemosyne, a work that would remain unfinished, aims 
precisely to create a “thought space” (Denkraum) with which to approach a 
cultural memory whose engrams result from the intersection of the individual 
and the collective, the cosmological and the corporal. Its goal is to illustrate the 
process of de-demonization of the heritage of phobic impressions, revealing 
pre-existing expressive values through the presentation of life in movement 
(Warburg, 2003, p. 3). Between 1924 and 1929 (the year of his death), and 
after recovering from psychosis, Warburg worked on this atlas, exploring the 
possibilities of constructing a history of art and culture through visual means. 
According to Didi-Huberman, 
The Bilderatlas, for Warburg, was neither a simple aide-mémoire, 
nor a “summary by images” of his thinking; instead, it o!ered an 
apparatus for putting thought back into movement where history 
had stopped, and where words were still lacking. It was the matrix 
of a desire to reconfigure memory by refusing to fix memories – 
images of the past – in an ordered or, worse, a definitive narrative. 
(Didi-Huberman, 2018, p. 12)
It is its open character and its visual intensity, linked with memory, that make 
Warburg’s atlas so disconcerting and stimulating.





It is now time to explore how the conceptual figure of the atlas relates to 
childhood, or rather, to the powers of childhood that can be recovered and 
exercised at di!erent stages of human life. For Benjamin, childhood is the age 
at which the mimetic faculty is most active, and with it the magical powers that 
tend to vanish in adulthood. As the “organon of experience” (Benjamin, 1999f, 
p. 868 [Qº, 24]), this faculty lies at the basis of our exercises with objects and 
matter; not only does it entail a power of imitation and (self-)transfiguration, 
but it is also what allows us to recognize similarities. 
This topic takes us to a set of notes in which Benjamin (see 1999c, pp. 
684-685) seeks to lay the foundation for rational reflection on astrology – 
reflection that is not ruled by the doctrine of magical “influences” or “radiant 
energies”. To do so, it is necessary to start with the question of similarity: on 
the one hand, from the recognition that, beyond “chance comparisons from 
our part”, there is a “mimetic force working expressly inside things”; on the 
other hand, from the recognition that the mimetic faculty inherent in the human 
being has undergone changes throughout history, weakening in certain fields to 
strengthen in others, and that our ability to create and recognize resemblances 
(between faces, in architecture and plants, in clouds and skin stains) reaches 
only a tiny part of those that exist in the “cosmos of similarity”.10
The exercises with the atlas manifest a desire for clairvoyance, or at least 
a fascination with the possibility of organizing that which is dispersed and 
liable to be forgotten or devoured by chaos. But even if this fascination contains 
something of a childhood playfulness, the truth is that clairvoyance requires 
accepting that there are things that cannot be controlled, that involuntary 
manifestations and the need to forget are part of the process. Fed by the “cosmos 
of similarity”, absorbing the dynamism of the faculty of imagination, the 
atlases that involve traumatic historical events (or at least our own individual 
traumas and personal Recherche, when taken seriously), cannot but respect the 
destructive forces of time. In an annotation to Atlas Mnemosyne (published in 
10 For an interpretation of the role of mimesis in Benjamin’s thinking, focusing particularly 
on the notion of a “cosmos of similarity”, see Fittler, 2005.
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Mnemosyne. Grundbegri!e, dated 2 July 1929) that describes an understanding 
of its iconography, Warburg says that the story of the influence of the ancients 
has fantastic elements and can be narrated like a tale, although it is a “history of 
ghosts for big people [Gespenstergeschichte f(ür) ganz Erwachsene]” (Warburg, 
apud Didi-Huberman, 2018, p. 197).
This “history of ghosts” points to an unconscious life of culture that can 
be extrapolated to more general considerations about the figure of the atlas. If 
on the one hand the latter draws something from the powers of childhood, on 
the other it presupposes a maturing of “productive disorder”, and therefore a 
new relationship with life (or a new relationship between history – individual 
and collective – and life). The unresolved dialectical tension between childhood 
and adulthood can enrich an atlas as it concerns the need for an exercise in 
matters of “vital importance”. A sentence by Proust already quoted in the first 
section of this chapter (“And I had already lived long enough…”) may set the 
tone for a further exploration of this dialectical tension. In Swann’s Way, the 
first volume of In Search of Lost Time, precisely before the famous episode of the 
madeleine, he speaks about the limitations of voluntary memory (linked to the 
intellect) and the existence of two types of chance that condition the possibility 
of attaining a true image of the past through involuntary memory. The first 
concerns the impossibility of knowing in advance which object conceals the 
past; the second concerns death and its unpredictability:
And so it is with our own past. It is a labour in vain to attempt 
to recapture it: all the e!orts of our intellect must prove futile. 
The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach 
of intellect, in some material object (in the sensation which that 
material object will give us) of which we have no inkling. And 
it depends on chance whether or not we come upon this object 
before we ourselves must die. (Proust, 1992, p. 60)
In “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, Benjamin reacted against the inevitability 
of chance, stating that it is not at all evident but rather part of a context of 
profound transformations in human experience, linked, among other aspects, 
to transformations in narrative forms (see Benjamin, 2003, pp. 315-316). For 
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Benjamin, a thinker of history and collective experience, this reduction of chance 
to an external coincidence related to individual experience could only cause 
reluctance. Given that chance is not dispelled that easily, however, it is perhaps 
necessary to think of it not as an external coincidence but as something that 
requires work, an exercise in the deepest sense of the word, linked, in Jeanne 
Marie Gagnebin’s words, to an e!ort of attention and to kairos, the time of 
opportunity that must be seized (see Gagnebin, 2002, pp. 119-120). Therefore, 
adulthood concerns those who have exercised this attention longingly, but also 
the capacity to integrate the destruction and reconstruction of the connections 
between things and beings, the passage of time, forgetfulness, death. Hence the 
importance that Proust concedes to the Baudelairian correspondances when, in 
Time Regained, he returns to the theme of the madeleine, commenting on the 
careful, selective capacity of Baudelaire’s poetry to follow the scent of a woman 
and to link it allegorically to an ideal that exceeds chance.11 Correspondances 
are the foundation of art that Proust makes his own, though by other means.
Independently of the type of force that is at work in involuntary memory, 
correspondences, or the cosmos of similarity – which also presupposes the 
mitigation of chance when understood as an external coincidence – the fact 
is that the three concepts form a web that is fundamental to the conceptual 
figure of the atlas: this web works with and against chance; it adds a further 
order of exercise to productive disorder; it makes the infinite interplay between 
childhood and adulthood a constructive one.
6.
COMPLEMENTS AND DANGERS
Throughout this chapter, several approaches have been explored in order to 
better characterize the atlas as a conceptual figure. Defining it in terms of 
productive disorder allowed us to investigate other features that complement 
each other – some encompassing the idea of visual knowledge from the outset. 
In this sense, the struggle against disorder and chaos under the auspices of 
11 Correspondances are also crucial for Benjamin’s reading of these topics, since they 
are capable of poetically integrating both the historical and the prehistorical (see 
Benjamin, 2003, pp. 333-334).
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careful observation, as well as the aesthetic, political and daily bodily-rooted 
exercises, often linked to physiognomic perception, are complemented by the 
relationship between autobiography, memory and life, which in turn demands 
the infinite interplay between childhood and adulthood. 
Nevertheless, there are two risks that threaten the productive side of 
disorder and the game of shu#ing and redistributing cards, risks that lurk 
within the figure of the atlas like a thief lurking behind a door, waiting for 
his chance. The first has to do with the modern temporality of the ever-new, 
embodied by mechanized work, by the constant sensorial stimuli in big cities, 
by the gambler’s gestures. After all, the table of heuristic operations may also 
be the table where the myriorama is laid out, a popular nineteenth-century toy 
composed of a set of illustrated cards, often representing a landscape, meant 
to be arranged and re-arranged in order to form di!erent combinations and 
pictures. According to Benjamin, it provides a paradigmatic account of a world 
of the most rigid discontinuity, the “time of hell” (Benjamin, 1999f, p. 843 [Gº, 
19]). If discontinuity and intermittence are part of the exercise of the atlas, the 
misuse of this ambivalent gesture can create an empty temporality devoid of 
history, memory and expectation. The disorder that never becomes productive 
and capitalist productive order are two sides of the same coin of modernity – the 
cult of novelty that feeds its voracity and its abyss. Our own epoch, dealing with 
the availability of an overwhelming amount of information about the world 
and connections that are made ever more quickly and invisibly, is experiencing 
new forms of voracity and empty temporality, which also raise new challenges. 
What practices remain to keep the reshu#ing game productive? And how does 
this a!ect the images we build of our cities? The answer to these questions will 
have to be reserved for another occasion.
The second risk has to do with forgetting a figure that is in the vicinity of 
everything that has been dealt with thus far: the ragpicker (Lumpensammler). 
As a dialectical counterpoint to the collector (Sammler), the ragpicker is 
someone who collects rags and waste from the streets as a means of survival, 
thus integrating in a particular way the economic and social system of the city 
and making us think of a form of collection (and also of a metaphor that is 
applicable to the historian, as Benjamin proposed) that entails everything that 
may become valuable. Forgetting this figure is risky because it means forgetting 
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the intersection between the economic condition of modernity and the fractures 
of history, as well as poverty itself, literally and metaphorically. In the chapter 
“Atlas and the Wandering Jew, or the Age of Poverty”, Didi-Huberman connects 
the ragpicker with both the modern city and the figure of the atlas. Portrayed in 
Eugène Atget’s photographic encyclopaedia and included in the gallery of figures 
of The Arcades Project, ragpickers belong to the nameless (Namenlosen), to 
whom Benjamin sought to dedicate his historical approach. Moreover, the task 
of drawing up modern atlases in the wake of great metropolises, the two World 
Wars and all the decisive events that shape our (natural) history cannot escape 
the struggle against a chaos made of poverty, wanderings and restlessness. 
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